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STATUTE OF FRAUDS-PROMISE TO PAY DEBT OF ANOTHE.Hartley v. Sandford, 50 AtI. 454 (Court of Errors and Appeals
of New Jersey, November 15, 1901). It is a curious commentary
upon the completeness of modern jurisprudence to discover in
a state as old as Ner Jersey the declaration, made recently in
its highest court of appeal, that the true character of an indemnity promise given by a third part to a surety, was re nova
and tat the question must be decided purely upon principle.
The case in which this matter at last presented itself to the
New Jersey courts for adjudication is worthy of notice, not only
because it involves a legal problem which, after more than a
-century's existence, still lacks a complete and final interpretation,
but because it touches upon one of the most common occurrences
in everyday business life.
Perhaps no portion of the famous Statute of Frauds has elicited such profound and profuse discussions or been the source
of so many fine distinctions as that section which declares that
"no action shall be brought to charge the defendant upon any
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special promise to answer for the debt, default'or miscarriage
of another unless the agreement upon which the action is brought
is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith."
This section constituted the defense in the present case and
the court was called upon to decide whether or not a promise to
indemnify a person for becoming surety for another was within
the terms of the statute. The facts were simple. A creditor of
the defendant's son required additional security, the defendant
thereupon requested the plaintiff to become surety for the son,
promising to reimburse him in case he should be called upon
to meet the debt. The plaintiff, relying upon this parol promise,
became surety for the son and having been compelled later to
pay the entire debt brought this action against the father. The
court finally held that recovery was impossible because the promise had not been reduced to writing. In the exposition, however, of its reasons for drawing this conclusion, the failure to
make more than a mere reference to what is practically the
crucial test in the matter leads'to considerable misapprehension
as to the true ground upon which the decision was made to rest.
To bring a promise within the statute certain elements have
long been universally recognized as essential. Of these the first
and most important is the existence of an .obligation by a third
person to the promisee. The liability assumed by the promisor
must be merely collateral to this original obligation. It will
be observed particularly that the obligation of the principal
debtor as well as that of the promisor exists in favor of the
same person, the promisee. Are these requirements satisfied
in the case of an indemnity promise? Under the facts before us
a promise by the father to the creditor himself to pay the debt,
if his son should fail, would clearly have been within the rule.
But as it was, the defendant did not'promise the plaintiff to
pay him a debt due to him, but rather to reimburse him for a
sum which might be paid by him to an outside party. The
obligations of the principal debtor and the promisor apparently
therefore fail to meet in the same individual and the one can
scarcely be considered as collateral to the other. This is the
view which now seems to prevail in England and a majority of
the American jurisdictions, including the United States Supreme
Court, all the New England states, New York, Indiana, Iowa,
Wisconsin, Kentucky and Georgia:. Guild v. Conrad, 2 Q. B. 885
(1894) ; Tormsley v. Sumraul, 2 Peters, 170 (i829); Jones v.
Bacon, 145 N. Y. 446 (1895) ; Anderson v. Spence, 72 Ind. 315
(1880); Smith v. Delaney, 64 Conn. 264 (1894) ; Barth v. Graf,
101 Wis. 27 (1898) ; Deweritt v. Bickford, 58 N. H. 523 (1879).
The implication of a promise on the part of the principal
debtor to repay all moneys advanced on his behalf by his surety
and the weight attached to this promise seem to mark the parting of the ways for the two lines of cases. It must be admitted
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that some confusion exists among those which hold the promisor
upon his oral promise. In Holmes v. Knights, 10 N. H. 175
(1839), it was said that the existence of an implied promise
would not prevent the surety from proceeding against the parol
promisor who was bound by an express agreement. Elsewhere
the very existence of the implied promise is denied on the ground
that the mere assent of the principal debtor to another, acting as'
his surety, as distinguished from any request or promise, is
insufficient to raise an implied promise, especially when
there was an express promise by a third party in consideration of the suretyship. Indeed, as was suggested, it is perfectly possible that the surety had been applied to first by the
debtor himself and had refused to act. His change of position,
based entirely on the promise received from the promisor, indicated clearly an original undertaking in spite of the debtor's
assent, which the circumstances rendered necessary. The leading text-book writers also accept the doctrine that a promise to
indemnify for becoming surety for a person, other than the
promisor, is not within the statute: 3 Parsons' Contracts, 6th
Ed. 21 n.; Roberts on Frauds,223; Throop's Verbal Agreements,
Sec. 361.
In ipite of the authorities with which this view of the question
is supported, other jurisdictions do not hesitate to arrive at an
absolutely different conclusion. The promise of the principal
debtor to reimburse his surety is implied at all times and an
absolute presumption is raised that the promise made by the
promisor was in contemplation of this contingent obligation
between the principal and the promisee. This doctrine is presented with remarkable clearness in the case of May v. Williams,
61 Miss. 126 (1883). The court there said that, at the moment
the bond is executed, the implied contract of the principal to
indemnify his surety springs up and the obligation of the promisor immediately becomes collateral thereto. This was, in spirit,
the reasoning pursued by the New Jersey court in the case now
under discussion. Pennsylvania, Illinois, Missouri, Alabama
and the Carolinas are in accord: Nugent v. Wolfe, 111 Pa. 471
(1886) ; Hurt v. Ford, 142 Mo. 283 (1897) ; Spear v. Farmers
Bank, 156 Ill. 555 (1895) ; Martin v. Black, 20 Ala. 309 (1852).
Where there is such a hopeless conflict in the authorities, a
reconciliation is scarcely possible, yet the suggestion made by
Mr. Parsons that the court should look always at the intentions
of the parties and the expressions used by them to decide whether
the promise is original or collateral, contains much merit.
If followed, when practical, it would frequently eliminate
many of the hardships flowing from the ironclad rule just
adopted in New Jersey. Certainly in this case the decision would
have been different. The promisor may be looked upon as having
said to the promisee, "In case you are called upon to pay this
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debt, come at once to me. I pronise to reimburse you. No
thought of any other intervening liability existed for a moment
in the mind of either party. In spite of this fact the court implied the obligation of the principal to his surety as a matter of
law and, proceeding upon the old maxim that all men are presumed to know the law, this obligation was deemed to have
formed an integral part of the promisor's contemplations. Perhaps this is theoretically correct, but its adoption must inevitably mean in a great number of cases a triumph of logic at the
expense of justice.
A. A., Jr.
WOMEN-RIGHT TO ADMISSION TO THE BA.R-REFUSED.-In
re Maddox, 50 AtL 457 (Court of Appeals, Maryland), Nov. 21,
1901). The decision in this case amounted to a refusal of the
Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland to badmit a woman to
the state bar. The application was based on two grounds: first,
that the right to practice law is a natural right inherent in all and
,annot be abridged by legislation; second, that under the Code
he word male included female, and therefore any woman posiessing the specified qualifications must be admitted.
The court answers the first contention by citing the cases of
.7 re Taylor, 48 Md: 28, and Bradwell's Case, 16 Wall. 142, in
vhich it was held that the right to practice law is not one of
he privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution to citizens of the United States.
The
power to regulate the admission of attorneys is one belong"ng to
the state, not to the Federal Government. This belongs
1o the police power of the state. The previous status of women
.t common law has made it evident that the profession of law
has never been one of their natural rights.
The authorities are too clear to require any comment and
Aowever much we may say as to the ability of women to practice law at the present day, we cannot criticise Mr. Justice
Bradley's opinion that in the past the profession of law has not
been regarded, by society or at common law, a natural occupation
for the sex.
The second ground for application is under the Code of Maryland, which provides that any male citizen possessing the specified qualifications shall be admitted to practicd law. Another
article of the Code declares that the masculine gender includes
all genders except where such construction would be absurd or
unreasonable.
The question then becomes this, whether it would be absurd and
unreasonable to construe the word male to include female when
applied to attorneys-at-law.
The court takes the ground that it would; because women were
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not allowed to practice law at common law, and had been allowed
to hold the public offices only of queen and overseer of the poor,
without express authority by statute.
It is submitted in objection to this view that though the fact
is established that no woman ever was admitted to practice at
the English bar, yet it does not appear that any woman ever
asked permission to practice there. It can hardly be of weight,
as an argument that no woman was ever permitted to practice
when the question has never even been raised nor passed on one
way or the other.
In America, however, there are many instances where different
conditions .have given rise to a different growth of the common
law. In this country women have been admitted to the bar and
have been practicing successfully for many years, which so alters
the case that the condition of affairs in England can hardly be
cited with fairness. In connection with this view we may cite
an Indiana case, Re Leack, 21 L. R. A. 701, in which the court
said, "Whatever the objections of the common law of England,
there is a law higher in this country, and better suited to the
rights and liabilities of American citizens, that law which
accords every citizen the natural right to gain a livelihood by
intelligence, honesty and industry in the arts, the sciences, the
professions or other vocations."
We may also cite an extract from a very able opinion by Judge
Thayer, of the Common Pleas Court of Philadelphia County, In
re Klgore, 14 W. N. C. 470.
"If there is any longer such thing as what old-fashioned philosophers and essayists used to call the sphere of woman it is, it

must be admitted, a sphere with an infinite and indeterminable
radius.... It is to me surprising that any one should speak with
apprehension of an impending social change by which women are
to seek fortune and fame in fields which were formerly denied
them. Such persons should awake from their slumbers. The
revolution is over. It was so gradual that perhaps you did not
observe it, or note the several steps of its progress. But it is
over."
It is submitted that in view of the fact that women were in 1886
admitted to practice in Iowa, Missouri, Michigan, Utah, District
of Columbia, Maine, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, Kansas,
Minnesota, California, Connecticut, MNassachusetts, Nebraska,
Washington, Pennsylvania, Colorado, New York, the Supreme
Court of the United States and now are admited in New Jersey,
and probably would be in other states where no test case has
arisen, that it would not be a forced construction of the Code to
hold-it to include females as applied to attorneys.
The learned judge has cited to support his opinion Robinson's
Case, 131 Mass. 376, which was decided under a statute admitting "citizens" to practice if properly qualified. This case wag
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decided in 1881 and before any woman had been admitted in
any state under a direct decision of the highest tribunal of the
state.
He also cites In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, which was decided as
early as 1875, and In re Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116, decided in
1873, and In re Stoneman, 53 Am. Rep. 323, not later than
1885, a New York case in which the statute using the word male
was held not to include female.
The question has always been one of interpretation, and interpretation which must be guided by the sentiment of the community at the time of rendering the decision. As a number of
judges have remarked, the pronoun "he," when used in criminal
statutes, has always been held to apply equally to women, for
women have always been considered as liable to prosecution and
conviction for crime as are men, so in constitutions and general
statutes the pronoun is invariably used to include both sexes,
and even the word male is often so held.
The first woman was admitted to the bar in Iowa in 1869,
but there were very few women attorneys until about 1890, when
the number began to increase rapidly. It follows from this fact
that the early decisions have very properly held that in the case
of attorneys the word male, or even the word citizen, did not
include women.
But even in the earlier days, in California, Foltz v. Hoge, 54
Cal. 28 (1879), in Connecticut In re Hall, 50 Conn. 131 (1882),
and in Pennsylvania In re Kilgore, 14 W. RV. 0. 466 (1883),
the statutes concerning the admission of attorneys were held to
include women.
The question has always been a debatable one until within the
last few years; but we can but feel, with Judge Thayer, that at
the present day it is no longer open for dispute; and the fact
that women are practicing law in the majority of states in the
Union should be taken into account in construing any statute
relating to the matter.
In conclusion the Maryland court decides that it being the
case that women cannot be admitted to the state bar as citizens,
they cannot for the same reason be admitted though they be
practicing lawyers in another state. This seems a fair conclusion from the prior argument, and the only logical way to carry
out the views of the court.
The whole opinion is an illustration of the conservatism of
the Maryland bench and we can but feel that it will not be long

before the legislature will alter the statute and so fall in line
with the other states, which, when there has been a decision
adverse to the admission of women, have invariably and without
delay (in the case of Massachusetts within a year), made an
alteration in the statute, which would admit women on an equal
footing with men.
F.A.K.

